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ABSTRACT: The major concepts of nationalist political thought in Tanzania
formed at the meeting point between local and international understandings of
exploitation, and prescriptions for its removal. These ideas were given social form
through a politics of enmity concerned with deﬁning enemies of the nation and
creating corresponding purge categories. Acquiring urban citizenship in Tanzania
required the demonstrated commitment to ﬁght exploitation for a party and state
hostile to urban growth. While such ideas formed the boundaries of legitimate
political debate, Africans struggling to lay claim to urban life appropriated
nationalist idioms to lampoon oﬃcial pieties and make sense of class diﬀerentiation
in a socialist country.
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H ISTORICALLY utilitarian in its conception, nationalism as a paradigm
has ‘overpowered its subject ’ in African studies.1 Reﬂecting this legacy,
historical examinations of Tanzanian nationalism have tended to focus on the
movement’s organizational aspects to the neglect of its intellectual content.2
To the extent that scholars have considered nationalist thought, they have
located its substance as either descending from generic African and Asian
anti-colonialism, ascending out of experiences of local resistance to European
colonial rule, or being identical to the intellectual development of Tanzania’s
ﬁrst president, Julius Nyerere. In these treatments, the country’s nationalist
party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), serves as both the
primary source and teleological subject of nationalist thought.3 The late
* I would like to thank Andrew Burton, Frederick Cooper, Jonathon Glassman, Andy
Ivaska, Richard Lepine, Leander Schneider and Luise White for their comments on
earlier drafts of this article. All translations are by the author.
1 M. Crawford Young, ‘Nationalism, ethnicity, and class in Africa: a retrospective’,
Cahiers d ’e´tudes africaines, 26 (1986), 436.
2 Young diagnosed this problem of African studies twenty years ago in his foundational
article, ibid. Some key works to heed this diagnosis include Steven Feierman, Peasant
Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania (Madison, 1990); John Lonsdale,
‘The moral economy of Mau Mau’, in John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, Unhappy
Valley: Conﬂict in Kenya and Africa (London, 1992), 265–504; Jonathon Glassman,
‘Sorting out the tribes: the creation of racial identities in colonial Zanzibar’s newspaper
wars’, Journal of African History, 41 (1999), 395–428; idem, ‘Slower than a massacre: the
multiple sources of racial thought in colonial Africa’, American Historical Review, 109
(2004), 720–54.
3 By far the best work on Tanganyikan nationalism remains John Iliﬀe, A Modern
History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979). To the extent that Iliﬀe examines TANU
nationalist ideology, he tends to characterize its content as owing much to its trailblazing
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Susan Geiger summarized the historiographical impasse when she observed
that even in John Iliﬀe’s superlative history of Tanganyika, he mistakenly
‘conﬂates nationalism and the nationalist movements such as TANU’.4
Using her criticism as a point of departure, this article argues that TANU
had no monopoly over the production of nationalist thought, but rather
worked within a shifting discursive ﬁeld consisting of international and
indigenous concepts and terms. TANU and the TANU-led, postcolonial
government were not unmoved movers of nationalism, but conduits and
translators of popular dissatisfaction limited by their commitment to
maintain public order. In Dar es Salaam, the main city of Tanzania, a
popular nationalist vocabulary developed that enabled Africans to carve out
rhetorical space in the face of steep economic and political obstacles. TANU
crafted and coined much of this vocabulary, but never fully controlled its
shifting content and meanings.
As a preliminary contribution, this article maps the contours of nationalist
political thought in Tanzania as it appeared in the language of the party,
government, press, poetry and literature. It seeks to trace and explain the
changes in nationalist thought and rhetoric that developed amidst the
poignant dilemma facing the TANU government – how to keep nationalist
promises of liberation while relying upon the inheritance of colonial order.
This article draws methodological inspiration from the political ethno-
graphic approach to authoritarian societies, which understands political
power as being signiﬁcantly constituted in the semiotic realm around politi-
cal metaphors, personality cults, iconography and ritual.5 It also employs
philological methods by examining developments in the keywords of
Kiswahili political vocabulary.6 The shared discursive activity of thinkers
under consideration here was the elaboration of what nationalism meant,
which Isaiah Berlin memorably deﬁned as ‘the straightening of bent backs’.7
Pursuing his insight, this article contends that African nationalists through-
out this period understood nationalism to mean ﬁrst and foremost the
elimination of exploitation. Ideas of exploitation developed in distinct ways
predecessors in India and Ghana, ibid. 509. For works locating nationalist thought as a
product of local resistance to colonialism, see E. B. M. Barongo, Mkiki Mkiki wa Siasa
Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam, 1966); I. N. Kimambo and A. J. Temu (eds.), A History of
Tanzania (Nairobi, 1969); Uloto Abubaker Uloto, Historia ya TANU (Dar es Salaam,
1971); M. H. Y. Kaniki, ‘The end of the colonial era’, in idem. (ed.), Tanzania under
Colonial Rule (London, 1979), 344–87; and Susan Geiger, TANU Women: Gender and
Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955–1965 (Portsmouth NH, 1997).
Many works tend to identify and conﬂate Nyerere’s thought with the nation’s thought,
but few as systematically as Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania, 1945–1968
(Cambridge, 1976).
4 Geiger, TANUWomen, 15. M. Crawford Young similarly observes that throughout
Africa, most studies of nationalism ‘took for granted an isomorphic relationship between
nationalism and parties’. Young, ‘Nationalism’, 430.
5 Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley, 2001); Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of
Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago, 1999);
Jeﬀrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to
Cold War (Princeton, 2000).
6 See generally, Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society
(New York, 1983).
7 Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York, 1991), 261.
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that emerged locally out of older pan-ethnic idioms of parasitism and
witchcraft eradication. Inextricable from discussions of exploitation was the
process of deﬁning who was a good citizen and belonged to the nation, and
who the enemy was. This process of deﬁning enemies and constructing purge
categories constituted a politics of enmity, or what Carl Schmitt holds to be
the fundamental feature of the political, the distinction between friend and
enemy.8 In Tanzania, the category of citizen consisted of three discernible
ideals: someone who was ‘African’; someone who either worked as a
labourer in urban areas or, preferably, as a farmer in rural areas; and some-
one who not only refrained from but also fought exploitation. The anti-urban
bias of the TANU government moved many town residents to develop an
alternative vocabulary that made sense of postcolonial social change and even
lampooned self-important oﬃcial rhetoric.9 Despite occasional discord, all
Tanzanian nationalists came to agree that membership in the new nation
depended on the commitment of each citizen to combat exploitation and the
enemies who thrive on it.
CITIZENSHIP AND IDIOMS IN THE COLONIAL CITY
For most people, urban life in late colonial Tanganyika revolved around
securing hard-won necessities like food and housing through low-paying
wage or petty commercial work.10 During the SecondWorldWar, the British
colonial state made deep commitments to regulate the distribution of urban
necessities in order to guarantee minimum standards of living in Dar es
Salaam. This raised the material value of urban citizenship, while moving
the state to restrict citizenship to ‘productive’ Africans only. To enforce
these restrictions, the colonial government began systematically to remove
underemployed and unemployed Africans to rural areas where their labour
could be utilized more eﬀectively.11 In addition to rural repatriation, a host of
other barriers confronted those Africans seeking to eke out an urban living.
Food costs constituted half of African household budgets, and foods were
mediated either through racialized state rationing schemes or black markets
dominated by Indian traders. Housing was similarly scarce and its access
racialized. African landlords proﬁted from the incursion of South Asians into
8 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago, 1996), 26. The political writings
of Schmitt, a former jurist for the Nazi regime in Germany, have recently undergone
signiﬁcant reappraisal. For a starting point, see Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An
Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (New York, 2000), and John McCormick, Carl
Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology (Cambridge, 1997).
9 In Tanzanie: l’invention d’une culture politique (Paris, 1988), Denis-Constant Martin
argues that Tanzania’s political vocabulary was neither spontaneous nor popular, but
rather the careful work of le pouvoir politique – party leaders, government authorities and
academics. The subsequent success of this vocabulary later depended on its ability to
resonate with the wider public. Martin, Tanzanie, 262–3. While this trajectory does apply
for some words, Martin makes no allowance for political vocabulary to be re-crafted and
even invented from below.
10 This paragraph is based on James R. Brennan, ‘Nation, race and urbanization in Dar
es Salaam, Tanzania, 1916–1976’ (Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 2002), ch. 3.
11 For a discussion of repatriation campaigns in the 1940s and 1950s, see Andrew
Burton, African Underclass: Urbanisation, Crime and Colonial Order in Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania (Oxford, 2005), ch. 12.
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African neighbourhoods like Kariakoo, while cynically joining African
tenants driven out by rising rents in decrying the loss of the neighbourhood’s
racial integrity. Indians or Arabs had greater interaction with Africans
than did the far fewer European residents of the town, and they served as a
ready measuring stick to gauge African urban progress. African residents
increasingly identiﬁed Indians and Arabs as their chief malefactors over the
1940s and 1950s on account of their unyielding domination of the town’s
commercial networks and mid-level civil service positions – the two most
reliable pathways to acquire a comfortable, ‘middle-class’ urban existence.
The political lives of urban Africans were organized around a multitude of
professional, ethnic and ngoma or dance societies. The most important of
these bodies was the African Association, originally a social club for African
civil servants that in 1954 reformed as the TANU, claiming to be the sole
representative of African interests. Members of this association, as well as
other African elites, understood the relationship between town and country
as the former exploiting the latter. Despite their own urban aspirations,
African elites in Tanganyika often voiced resentment towards the freedom
from agricultural drudgery enjoyed by fellow urban residents,12 and were
well aware of the colonial racial hypocrisy which demanded that they stay on
farms to produce foods while Europeans and South Asians enjoyed the fruits
of urban life. Erica Fiah, an African newspaper editor in Dar es Salaam
frustrated with the hollow rhetoric of wartime sacriﬁce for uhuru (freedom),
argued that ‘the African shouldn’t have to farm alone! Do Europeans and
Indians back in their homelands not get food by farming?’13 There was also
a shared disgust with economic disparities resulting from exploitation
in colonial Tanganyika. Social and economic inequalities between ‘non-
Africans’ and Africans were often staggering, and acquired political meaning
in plainly unequal commercial exchanges. Such transactions took many
forms, such as poor wages from wealthy employers, low wholesale prices for
African produce resold at a high proﬁt, and were understood through moral
idioms that attacked individual enrichment as necessarily coming at the ex-
pense of community welfare.14 The most striking belief was the view that
certain non-Africans and their African employees were vampires who ex-
tracted blood from unsuspecting Africans at night in order to makemedicines
that would further increase their powers, otherwise known as mumiani.15
12 This sentiment is most plain in the letters and editorials of the newspaper Kwetu
(Dar es Salaam, 1937–51). 13 Kwetu, 9 Jan. 1944.
14 It is a commonplace of African witchcraft studies that such ‘zero-sum’ moral idioms
structure witchcraft beliefs. Ralph Austen usefully summarizes the similarities between
moral economy and witchcraft by writing that the central trope of moral economy posits
an opposition between ‘the maximizing individual and ever-expanding market’ on the
one hand, and ‘a community governed by norms of collective survival and believing in a
zero-sum universe – that is, a world where all proﬁt is gained at someone else’s loss’, on
the other. ‘The communal/zero-sum side of this equation is broadly consistent with
African beliefs identifying capitalism and witchcraft as the dangerous appropriation of
limited reproductive resources by selﬁsh individuals’. Ralph Austen, ‘The moral econ-
omy of witchcraft : an essay in comparative history’, in Jean Comaroﬀ and John Comaroﬀ
(eds.), Modernity and Its Malcontents: Ritual and Power in Postcolonial Africa (Chicago,
1993), 92.
15 For a regional overview, see Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and
History in Colonial Africa (Berkeley, 2000), 10–30. For Tanzania, see Peter Pels,
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Although economic growth in the 1950s presented unprecedented urban
opportunities for Africans, immigrants to towns still faced high living
costs and a hostile government. TANU, which embarked on successful
membership drives in Dar es Salaam through speeches keenly attuned to
the complaints of local citizens against exploitation, grew territorially at an
exponential pace after 1955. TANU speakers regularly attacked colonial
exploitation by using vivid metaphors of blood and suction. The formidable
Bibi Titi Mohamed warned a crowd in the Southern Highlands that ‘[t]here
are C.I.D. people here, Africans who sell the blood of their fellows for what?
Sh. 50/- or even Sh. 20/-’. Haruna Idi Taratibu told a Dodoma crowd to
respect the British Government but scorn Indians who had come to Kenya as
poor labourers to build a railway line and stayed behind to become rich at
Africans’ expense. John Mwakangale told a Southern Province crowd that
the whites have sucked our blood for too long, it cannot be tolerated …We have
been quiet under the yoke because we have only just begun to realise how much we
were being exploited … The Arabs tied chains around our necks and sent us to
America; the British would like to do likewise.16
Throughout Tanganyika, TANU nationalists utilized trans-ethnic African
idioms which understood the exploitation of strangers as the metaphorical-
to-literal sucking of blood or other ﬂuids from indigenous people – in
Swahili, unyonyaji. At its most dramatic, concerns about unyonyaji took the
form of mumiani scares, which were particularly prominent in the late 1950s
throughout East and Central Africa. In the Dar es Salaam suburb of
Buguruni, a violent episode occurred in 1959 that resulted in the death of a
police oﬃcer believed to be mumiani. Although TANU leaders condemned
the violence and ‘superstition’ associated with this event,17 they embraced its
underlying sentiment. Unyonyaji was becoming a central part of political
discourse, within which fantastic beliefs about vampires stood at one edge of
a wide spectrum. The party’s watchword, however, was uhuru, translated
as ‘freedom’ and historically embedded initially in the complex history of
pawnship, slavery and abolition, and later revived in colonial propaganda
of the Second World War.18 Fearing the spread of radical interpretations of
‘Mumiani : the white vampire’, Etnofoor, 5 (1992), 165–87; E. C. Baker, ‘Mumiani’,
Tanganyika Notes and Records, 21 (1946), 108–9; minutes in Tanzania National Archives
(TNA) 21855; and correspondence inMambo Leo, Nov. 1923 to Oct. 1926.
16 ‘African political aﬀairs’, enclosed in Grattan-Bellew to Webber, 16 Feb. 1959,
Colonial Oﬃce (CO) 822/1325/1B, Public Records Oﬃce (now the National Archives),
Kew.
17 Tanganyika Standard, 21 Feb. 1959. This event is addressed in James R. Brennan,
‘Uhuru and mumiani : Buguruni on the eve of Tanganyika’s independence’, paper deliv-
ered at the African Studies Association annual meeting, 1998.
18 Uhuru coexisted with uungwana as nineteenth-century terms referring to freedom
from slavery. Reception of the nationalist message of uhuru in the 1950s varied not just by
area but by town – in Shambai, uhuru was associated with emancipation from pawnship
and connoted the end of a social order where individuals were valued over lineages; in the
former fugitive slave community of Makorora on the coast, TANU’s uhuru was met
coldly by residents who understood the term as a re-negotiation of patronage and
proudly announced they had already received uhuru from Sultan Barghash. Feierman,
Peasant Intellectuals, 213; Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and
Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856–1888 (Portsmouth NH, 1995), 113. The
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uhuru, which some took to mean freedom from taxation, the colonial
government enjoined TANU to explain that Uhuru ni Jasho (Freedom is
Sweat), and encouraged it to spread a new slogan, Uhuru na Kazi (Freedom
and Work).19 The rhetoric of many party nationalists met the understanding
of urban Africans concerned with improving their daily lives with arguments
that uhuru meant freedom from exploitation or unyonyaji, which nationalists
promised to remove in their bid to protect fellow Africans. Elaborating on
what exploitation or unyonyaji meant and how best to combat it became an
important topic of postcolonial discourse and debate.
UNYONYAJI NA MIRIJA : CREATING A NATIONALIST VOCABULARY IN
UJAMAA TANZANIA
A growing literature has identiﬁed and addressed the signiﬁcant continuities
between the colonial and postcolonial ambitions of the state in Africa.20
In urban Tanzania, the postcolonial government continued its predecessor’s
emphasis on maintaining living standards by regulating costs of urban
necessities and trying to limit urban citizenship to ‘productive’ (i.e.
fully employed) Africans. There were however signiﬁcant discontinuities,
particularly pronounced in urban areas. The TANU government would not
tolerate the legacy of racial privilege and segregation, and dissolved certain
individual property rights by asserting the administration’s discretionary
control over all lands and several buildings. Shortly after independence,
Julius Nyerere had proclaimed that ujamaa or ‘African Socialism’ was
Tanganyika’s aim, and that there was ‘[n]o room for land parasites’.21 In
1962, the same year that Nyerere published his pamphlet Ujamaa – The
Basis of African Socialism, the government eﬀectively nationalized all
lands through the Freehold Titles Act. Opportunities for public political
dissent quickly constricted after independence and were practically
eliminated following the abortive 1964 army mutiny, after which Tanzania’s
labour unions were nationalized and a one-party state was constitutionally
inscribed the next year.22 The Arusha Declaration restated Tanzania’s
popularization of uhuru came out of the East African Inter-territorial Language
Committee’s recommendations for wartime propaganda, where it was used throughout
the colony but particularly in towns to explain the need for Africans to agree to military
and labour conscription and lower living standards as sacriﬁce for the war eﬀort for
everyone’s uhuru against Axis powers. See for example Shaaban Robert, Utenzi wa vita
vya uhuru (Nairobi, 1967). In towns such as Dar es Salaam, this association of uhuru with
sacriﬁce emboldened Africans to claim fair recompense, which TANU promised in its
inversion of this late colonial propaganda term.
19 Tanganyika Standard, 10 Oct. 1959; ‘Baada ya Uhuru ni Nini? ’ by ‘Msema Kweli ’,
Mwafrika, 12 Dec. 1959; Randal Sadleir, Tanzania: Journey to Republic (London, 1999),
227–30.
20 See in particular Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa
and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, 1996), and Frederick Cooper, Africa since
1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge, 2002).
21 Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism (1962), reprinted in
Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (London, 1966), 162–171; Tanganyika Standard, 16
Apr. 1962.
22 For a history of this process from the perspective of Tanganyika’s opposition parties,
see James R. Brennan, ‘The short history of political opposition and multi-party
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urban policy as primarily state regulation of migration and basic
necessities. The shift in urban policy was mainly racial – the state
increasingly targeted businesses and properties controlled by non-
Africans, particularly South Asians, through discursive purge categories of
ujamaa.23
Ujamaa roughly translates as ‘familyhood’, and this term itself has
understandably served as the point of departure for conceptual discussions of
Tanzanian socialism. ‘The foundation, and the objective, of African social-
ism’, Julius Nyerere wrote, ‘ is the extended family’.24 In his formulation,
ujamaa calls for the return to African traditional society, presently damaged
or destroyed by European colonialism but where previously there had been
‘hardly any room for parasitism’. True socialism was an ‘attitude of the
mind’ where people fought the acquisitive impulse that led individuals or
groups within the ‘tribe’ to exploit one another.25 As it permeated and
developed in the country’s public sphere after 1962, however, the intellectual
content of ujamaa became much more than the background and trajectory
of Julius Nyerere’s thought,26 transforming into a popular language with
unintended consequences. Nyerere’s promise to remove parasitism re-
sounded with the public, but neither he nor they really sought to return to the
deeply romanticized ‘African traditional society’ that theoretically under-
girded ujamaa. Much subsequent political debate would instead turn on
who did or did not belong to the new ujamaa family, and how this could be
divined.
At the centre of popular ujamaa rhetoric stood the idea of unyonyaji,
which literally translates as ‘sucking’ or ‘suckling’. Nationalists translated
unyonyaji into English as the conventional socialist term ‘exploitation’, but
the core meanings to which unyonyaji appealed were grounded on distinctly
democracy in Tanganyika, 1958–1964’, in Gregory H. Maddox and James L. Giblin
(eds.), In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence in Tanzania (Oxford,
2005), 250–76.
23 Nyerere’s government supported a voluntary urban cooperative after independence
(COSATU), and in 1967 began a wave of nationalizations: wholesale business (1967),
housing (1971) and retail shops (1976), and also banned pawnshops (1972). Andrew
Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy (Oxford, 1982), passim.
24 Michael Schatzberg has demonstrated that the idiom of family as nation is ubiqui-
tous in oﬃcial postcolonial discourses throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa. See his
Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food (Bloomington, 2001).
25 Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 162.
26 Many studies on the intellectual content of ujamaa understand it almost exclusively
as a product of Nyerere’s intellectual biography. In addition to Pratt, The Critical Phase,
see Ahmed Mohiddin, ‘Ujamaa na Kujitegemea’, in Lionel Cliﬀe and John Saul (eds.),
Socialism in Tanzania, I : Politics (Nairobi, 1972), 165–76; William Redman Duggan and
John R. Civille, Tanzania and Nyerere: A Study of Ujamaa and Nationhood (Maryknoll,
1976); J. L. Kanywanya, ‘Theoretical problems of Ujamaa’, in Jeannette Hartmann
(ed.), Re-thinking the Arusha Declaration (Copenhagen: Center for Development
Research, 1991), 45–53; and most recently, Victoria Sto¨ger-Eising, ‘Ujamaa revisited:
indigenous and European inﬂuences in Nyerere’s social and political thought’, Africa, 70
(2000), 118–43. For an overview, see Dean E. McHenry, Jr., Limited Choices: The
Political Struggle for Socialism in Tanzania (Boulder, 1994), 15–28. A major exception to
this that takes national political thought seriously is the work of Denis-Constant Martin:
Tanzanie, and ‘The emergence of original political cultures in Africa: the case of
Tanzania’ (Pau: Universite´ de Pau et des pays de l’Adour, 1988).
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local beliefs and metaphors.27 In one very popular and long-standing
campaign, nationalists pronounced ujamaa to be dawa ya unyonyaji, or the
medicine to combat and protect against ‘sucking’. This campaign appealed
to the widely held belief that people needed medical protection from evil
spirits and exorcism for those already bewitched. The eradication of uchawi
or ‘witchcraft ’ had long been a concern of Africans throughout East and
Central Africa, upon which itinerant waganga or traditional healers could
build lucrative medical/exorcist practices. These beliefs ﬂourished in Dar es
Salaam, where people from most classes and backgrounds feared bewitching
by evil spirits (locally referred to as shetani or jini) or malevolent sorcerers
(wachawi) – particularly in peri-urban areas such as Buguruni, site of the
1959 mumiani riot. Contemporary with the Arusha Declaration in the late
1960s, local residents in peri-urban neighbourhoods patronized a famous
mganga, Hamedi Said Matoroka, to administer medicine (dawa) to them.
Unlike their colonial predecessors, the regional commissioner and neigh-
bourhood TANU oﬃcers not only welcomed Matoroka – who followed in a
long line of Ngindo-trained waganga selling dawa for use against evil spirits
in peri-urban Dar es Salaam28 – but asked that local residents cooperate
rather than hinder his work. Fear of bewitching, these oﬃcials believed, had
discouraged local residents from investing in modern buildings and style of
dress, and they hoped Matoroka’s dawa would improve conditions.29 Those
who did not buy the medicine had to fear accusations of uchawi, and the
many who purchased the dawa gave over huge sums that Matoroka shared
27 It is diﬃcult to overstate how deeply the term unyonyaji penetrated nationalist
discourse. An editorial from the TANU party newspaper Uhuru on the presumably in-
nocuous question of radio licence fees gives some clue: ‘There are several types of un-
yonyaji. There is the person who exploits [literally ‘sucks’, kumnyonya] another person or
the person who exploits the Nation. Although it is true that many of us really hate ex-
ploiters [wanyonyaji], but we always forget to ask ourselves if we ourselves exploit or not.
Maybe you who have your radio, and every day at 600 you listen to music, world news
etc., have you already cut your straw of unyonyaji regarding your radio? Have you already
paid your radio licence for this year? If not, why in your heart do you hate so much
unyonyaji? Remember that the machines that broadcast the news every day is paid by the
money of society’. ‘Unyonyaji ’, Uhuru, 27 Mar. 1968.
28 Territorially famous waganga predecessors of Hamedi Said Matoroka (or
‘Matoloka’) who also administered dawa in peri-urban Dar es Salaam include: Ngoja bin
Kimweta, Makwera Kasongo (‘Songo’) and Nguvumali. ‘Extract from report of the Dar
es Salaam District for March 1925’, TNA 57/8/4/41; C. E. Lane, ‘Ngoja’, African
Observer 6 (Feb. 1937), 73–80; Simeon Mesaki, ‘Witchcraft and witch-killings in
Tanzania: paradox and dilemma’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1993), 119–52;
J. C. Cairns, Bush and Boma (London, 1959), 145–9; Peter Lienhardt, The Medicine
Man: Swifa ya Nguvumali (Oxford, 1968), 51–80; Lorne Larson, ‘Problems in the study
of witchcraft eradication movements in southern Tanzania’, Ufahamu, 6 (1976), 88–100.
29 Outside Dar es Salaam, witchcraft eradication or ‘shaving’ movements remained
robust in parts of rural Tanzania throughout the twentieth century. The late colonial and
postcolonial states occasionally cooperated with anti-witchcraft leaders, in Ulanga to
mobilize their followers for rural development schemes. For cases in Uhehe and Ulanga,
see, respectively, Alison Redmayne, ‘Chikanga: an African diviner with an international
reputation’, in Mary Douglas (ed.), Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations (London,
1970), 123–4; andMaia Green, ‘Witchcraft suppression practices and movements: public
politics and the logic of puriﬁcation’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 39
(1997), 337–41.
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with TANU and government oﬃcials.30 Nationalists thus could be pragmatic
enough to utilize such profoundly ‘unmodern’ means to meet distinctly
modern goals of maendeleo or ‘development’.31 The often-used metaphor of
ujamaa as dawa for unyonyaji demonstrates the successful grafting of local
discourses to the Fabian socialism of Julius Nyerere.
The colonial state had dismissed witchcraft eradication discourse
and prohibited anti-witchcraft leaders from selecting sorcerers (wachawi)
to eradicate it. In its production of ujamaa thought, the postcolonial state
embraced key elements of eradication discourse, and jealously guarded for
itself the task of selecting the nation’s enemies for eradication. The principal
duty of the ujamaa revolution was to remove – Nyerere stated in 1965 that the
meaning of revolution was not simply to remove government, but to remove
exploitation and bring justice in its place.32 Arising from this desire, a
nationalist-socialist language quickly emerged in the early years of indepen-
dence. Unyonyaji invoked obviously biological forms of parasitism. Usiwe
kupe or ‘don’t be a tick’ was a popular ujamaa slogan that tapped into
familiar frustrations with local parasites. Socialmakupe or ticks were inimical
to national development and progress, and as such were rhetorically targeted
for removal. But unlike Rwanda’s inyenzi or cockroaches – a term which
originally referred to monarchist Tutsi guerrillas and later appropriated by
Hutu ge´nocidaires to mark Tutsis for extermination – Tanzania’s makupe
could cease to be vermin by adopting socialist behaviour. Alongside the
vocabulary of biological parasites emerged a sociological terminology that
translated local social strata into a more conventionally socialist vocabulary
of enemies.33 Several words however nicely bridged the chasm between
30 Ngurumo, 14 Feb. 1961 and 17 Jan. 1969; Lloyd Swantz, The Medicine Man among
the Zaramo of Dar es Salaam (Uppsala, 1990), 47–51.
31 For a treatment of this phenomenon cast in terms of a postcolonial engagement with
modernity in Cameroon, see Peter Geschiere, The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and
the Occult in Postcolonial Africa (Charlottesville, 1997). Perhaps the strongest connection
between the Maji Maji uprising of 1905–7 and the later nationalist movement is not the
former’s ‘mass mobilization against colonialism’ but rather the willingness of TANU to
adopt metaphors of, and even occasionally the services of, famous territorial waganga who
drew their authority from training with famous Ngindo healers, dating back to the period
of Kinjitikile and Ngoja’s father, Kimwera. See Terence Ranger, ‘Witch-craft eradication
movements in central and southern Tanzania and their connection with the Maji Maji
Rising’, Seminar Paper, University College, Dar es Salaam, 30 Nov. 1966.
32 Uhuru, 13 Feb. 1965. The Kiswahili verb kuondoa (to remove) is particularly
prominent in government ujamaa rhetoric. Original reads: Maana ya Mapinduzi sio
kuondoa Serikali tu. Maana yake ni kuondoa udhalimu na kuleta haki badala yake. On
colonial-era witchcraft eradication and government reaction, see Mesaki, ‘Witchcraft and
witch-killings in Tanzania’, 91–118.
33 Bwanyenye, deriving from the Bantu root -enye indicating ownership, translated as
‘bourgeoisie ’ and was used in reference to urban exploiters; kabaila, deriving from
Arabic, referred unambiguously to socio-political status and translated as ‘feudalist ’ in
reference to land-owning, rural exploiters; bepari, deriving from Gujarati (the language
of many East African Indians), meant ‘merchant’, and rather appropriately served as
the Swahili gloss for ‘capitalist ’. For contemporary word lists, see Carol M. Scotton,
‘Some Swahili political words’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 3 (1965), 527–41;
V. Ostrovsky and J. Tejani, ‘Second tentative word list ’, Swahili, 37 (1967), 209–24, and
38 (1968) 54–99; Harold A. Goldklang, ‘Current Swahili newspaper terminology’,
Swahili, 37 (1967), 194–208, and 38 (1968), 42–53; C. W. Temu, ‘The development of
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formal socialist terminology and popular usage and meaning. Wahuni or
‘hooligans’, yet another enemy of ujamaa, took on a rich array of meanings
in reference to public anxiety towards young, unemployed African men
over the late colonial and postcolonial context of urban Tanzania.34 Mhuni
captured the unease of more established urban residents with crime and
the breakdown of social order, and served as a discursive antonym for the
mwananchi or ‘citizen’, distinguished by his employment, marriage and
implied loyalty to party leaders and urban administrators. The many
colourful embodiments of the wanyonyaji or exploiters of Tanzania – kupe,
mhuni, kabaila, bwanyenye, bepari – together comprised the purge categories
of nationalist discourse. These terms were employed more intensively in the
public sphere after independence, and particularly after the Arusha
Declaration, when TANU published a political primer that oﬃcially deﬁned
the meanings of these terms.35
Amidst these rich epithets stood the oﬃcial image that justiﬁed
ujamaa – the problem of unyonyaji na mirija or ‘sucking with straws’.36
The image had two manifestations. The ﬁrst portrayed an African man or
men sitting around a jug sucking alcoholic drink with a straw; the second
represented non-Africans or ‘exploiter’ Africans standing around a poor,
thin African sucking his sweat or blood with straws. The ﬁrst image
acts to reproach Africans who prefer indolence and intoxication to doing
the nation’s work; the second image links and deliberately confuses literal
fears of blood-sucking by foreigners with the idiom of parasites who
proﬁt from the sweat of others. The second, more explosive image was
also treated by Ngurumo in a series of political cartoons in the wake of
the Arusha Declaration. It depicts a slim young African, wearing only a hat
and shorts, surrounded by four corpulent wanyonyaji or exploiters – a
European, an Arab, an Indian (with passport in breast pocket), and an
African – who are sucking blood from straws inserted in the African’s body.
In the following cartoon, his expression turns from one of pain to joy as black
arms holding scissors cut the straws. The caption reads mirija imekatika,
‘ the straws have been cut’, the deﬁning act of ujamaa that ends the young
man’s suﬀering. In the next scene he is depicted as now having not only
political vocabulary in Swahili ’, Kiswahili, 41 (1971), 3–17; J. K. Kiimbila, ‘Uchunguzi
wa maneno ya kisiasa’, Kiswahili, 41 (1971), 18–21; and L. M. Thonya, Misingi ya
Kiswahili (Dar es Salaam, 1978), 21–32. For another analysis of Tanzania’s political vo-
cabulary, see Martin, Tanzanie, 248–70.
34 Burton, African Underclass, 4–6. The words uhuni and mhuni may have gained cur-
rency in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as they do not appear in Krapf’s
1882 dictionary; they derive from an Arabic term meaning someone disloyal or a traitor,
but developed wider meanings by the time of Johnson’s 1939 dictionary as ‘vagabond’
and, later, ‘hooligan’.
35 TANU, Mafunzo ya Azimio la Arusha na Siasa ya TANU juu ya Ujamaa na
Kujitegemea (Dar es Salaam, 1967), 36–7.
36 The party deﬁned unyonyaji as hali ya maisha inayomwezesha mtu au kikundi cha
watu au tabaka la watu kupata ridhiki bila kufanya kazi kwa kutumia mtu au watu au
tabaka jingine la watu (condition of life that enables a person or group of people or class of
people to get necessities without working by using a person or another class of people),
and mrija as chombo kinachotumika kwa kunyonyea jasho la mtu au watu wengine (apparatus
used for sucking sweat of another person or people). Ibid.
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the strength to farm with his hoe but also to strike the wanyonyaji still
surrounding him.37
Fig. 1. Sucking blood. Cartoon from Ngurumo, 7 Feb. 1967.
37 The ﬁrst image appears occasionally in the pages of Ngurumo, an independent
Swahili newspaper published in Dar es Salaam. One cartoon depicts Malawian dictator
Hastings Banda sitting on a stool and sucking through a straw labelled ‘South
Africa – Rhodesia ’ the ﬂuids contained in two jugs labelled ‘Malawi’ and ‘Africa’.
Ngurumo, 6–13 Feb., 20 Sept. 1967. Nyerere himself enters later cartoons as fagio la
EXPLOITATION AND URBAN CIT IZENSHIP IN TANZANIA 399
Following the Arusha Declaration, the language of battling unyonyaji
became ubiquitous and served as a ritual mantra to signify citizenship.
Government produced a didactic pamphlet for its civil servants explaining
how self-reliance (kujitegemea) applies to the workplace. The pamphlet be-
gins by deﬁning mnyonyaji (the exploiter) as ‘one who lives without working;
lives oﬀ of the sweat of others’. Its goal is to make the civil servant reﬂect on
his role in ujamaa and instruct him to question whether his actions were
exploitative and/or parasitic.38 Among the state-supported artists who duti-
fully applied the now-oﬃcial language to their work, one poet of the popular
shairi verse oﬀered a representation of ujamaa’s enemies in the government
paper Uhuru :
What punishment should we give, to those guilty of sucking
Who suck like a tick, until they clot and die from sucking
They don’t let go even when burned with a wick, how will we warn them
What punishment should we give, to the exploiters of Tanzania?39
This language also thrived in English propaganda. In an article about the
growth of political consciousness, a reporter for the government’s English-
language newspaper observed that ‘[t]here is not a word in Tanzania which
is as loathed as ‘‘unyonyaji ’’ … It is repeatedly uttered at every place of
work and in every home to remind the un-initiated of the dangers of
exploitation’.40 The nationalist elaboration of unyonyaji bridged local
understandings of extraction with international socialist prescriptions for
economic justice, and enabled the TANU state to signify who belonged to
the new nation and, more importantly, who did not.
RURAL BIAS AND URBAN CITIZENSHIP IN UJAMAA SOCIALISM
Ujamaa ideology stressed that the nation’s primary activity was agriculture,
and implied that cities themselves, particularly Dar es Salaam, were parasites
on the nation’s agricultural sweat. The Arusha Declaration emphasized
agricultural over industrial production, and Nyerere evinced deep agrarian
sensibilities – traceable among urban-based Tanzanian intellectuals since
Erica Fiah in the 1940s – in his prediction of potential forms of class conﬂict:
‘If we are not careful we might get to the position where the real exploitation
ujamaa or ‘broom of ujamaa’, sweeping away the insect-like wanyonyaji ; in another he
fuels the ﬁre burning the exploiters, together in a sack called ubepari (capitalism) with
wood called taifa (nation). The eradication of blood-sucking, the reader understands, is
now nearing completion thanks to Nyerere’s war against the exploiters.
38 Joseph A. Namata, Huduma Serikalini na Siasa ya Kujitegemea (Dar es Salaam,
1967). A series of questions for workers to ask themselves are provided to promote proper
behaviour and eliminate exploiting/sucking (huku ni kunyonya?), covering such matters as
arriving late to work and criticizing others to gain promotions. The pamphlet oﬀered a
disturbingly prophetic criticism that a farmer might direct at a bureaucrat – ‘your game is
my death’ (mchezo wenu ni mauti yangu).
39 ‘Adhabu Gani Tuwape’ by M. A. Rupembecho, Uhuru, 22 Dec. 1971, reprinted in
Matunda ya Azimio: Mashairi ya mwamko wa siasa (Dar es Salaam, 1980), 29. Original
Kiswahili reads: Adhabu gani tuwape, wenye kosa la kunyonya/Wanyonyao kama kupe,
wagande wafe kunyonya/Hawaachi japo kope, vipi tutavyowaonya/Adhabu gani tuwape,
wanyonyaji Tanzania?
40 ‘Growth of political consciousness’ by Costa Kumalija, Nationalist, 8 Dec. 1971.
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in Tanzania is that of the town dwellers exploiting the peasants’.41 The
country’s decentralization policy removed several productive activities from
Dar es Salaam, culminating in the transfer of the capital to Dodoma in 1974.
Such was oﬃcial prejudice against cities that trade unionists felt compelled to
hold public meetings to state that urban workers did not exploit farmers, but
joined with them in their struggle against capitalists.42
Such anti-urban sensibilities were commonly expressed in nationalist
rhetoric. Propagandistic cartoons addressed the unwillingness of urbanites
to do the nation’s work on farms. One depicted a hoe chasing an unwilling
farmer with the caption reading ‘don’t fear the hoe’ ; another showed an
urban water carrier being handed a hoe by an arm inscribed taifa (‘nation’)
with the caption reading ‘you will build with the hoe, not with the
water can’.43 One memorable ujamaa image in the popular press shows
Nyerere driving a bulldozer labelled ‘Arusha’ to knock down a multi-
storeyed building held up by regional foe Hastings Banda, the anti-socialist,
anti-liberationist President of Malawi – the multi-storeyed building re-
presenting the dual enemies of dense urbanization and capital accumulation.
Government encouraged the publication of stories, plays and personal
testimonials, and produced its own propaganda pamphlets to convince urban
residents that life on ujamaa or cooperative villages was far superior to the
uncertainties and immoralities of town life.44 The state-owned Tanzania
Film Company released its ﬁrst and only feature-length ﬁlm in 1976 entitled
Fimbo ya Mnyonge or ‘The Poor Man’s Stick’. The ﬁlm, as crudely didactic
as any colonial-era production designed to discourage urban immigration,
told the story of a man named Yombayomba who subsists in his rural home
by begging friends for food. Yombayomba – a play on ombaomba, a term for
beggars – migrates to a town where he tries petty commerce, the occupation
of choice for most young men, but fails. At this point Yombayomba decides
to visit the TANU headquarters, where he is advised to join an ujamaa
village, and after further urban frustrations, including assault by a gang, the
protagonist and his wife eventually re-locate. Despite their seeming material
poverty, the villagers educate Yombayomba on the meaning of ujamaa,
and he later returns to his home village to transform it into a true ujamaa
41 Julius K. Nyerere, ‘The Arusha Declaration’, inUjamaa: Essays on Socialism (New
York, 1968), 28, quoted in Rodger Yeager, Tanzania: An African Experiment (Boulder,
1989), 72.
42 ‘Wafanyakazi hawanyonyi wakulima’, Kusare, 23 Sept. 1967. For an overview of
postcolonial eﬀorts to reduce the importance of Dar es Salaam, see Larry Sawers, ‘Urban
primacy in Tanzania’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 37 (1989), 841–59;
and Yeager, Tanzania, 74–6.
43 Cartoons fromNgurumo, 14 and 18Mar. 1967. Original reads utajenga kwa jembe siyo
kwa debe.
44 See, inter alia, numerous ujamaa village articles in the Kivukoni College journal
Ujamaa, 1968–74; Tanganyika African National Union, Maisha ya Ujamaa (Dar es
Salaam, c. 1972); Ngalimecha Ngahyoma, Kijiji Chetu (Dar es Salaam, 1975); I. C.
Mbenna, Siuwezi Ujamaa (Nairobi, 1976); ‘Kijiji bora cha Gezaulole’ by Koheretz
Magessa, Uhuru, 4 Sept. 1975. For an important revision of Tanzania’s villagization
experience, see Leander Schneider, ‘Developmentalism and its failings: why rural de-
velopment went wrong in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania’ (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia
University, 2003).
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Fig. 2. ‘You will build with the hoe, not with the water can’. Cartoon from
Ngurumo, 14 Mar. 1967.
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settlement – concluding that ‘the poor man’s stick is to live together,
ujamaa is to live together’.45
Urban idlers were condemned as exploiters, the wahuni or unemployed
young men living in towns being the most egregious sinners in this regard. In
his 1962 pamphlet, Ujamaa, Nyerere asserted that in traditional African
society everyone had been a worker and ‘[l]oitering was an unthinkable
disgrace’. He wrote that ‘I do not use the word ‘‘worker’’ simply as opposed
to ‘‘employer’’, but also as opposed to ‘‘ loiterer’’ or ‘‘ idler’’ ’.46 Violating the
national work ethic was in itself a form of exploitation, albeit exploitation of
omission rather than commission. The postcolonial state redoubled its
predecessor’s policy of the demonization and repatriation of the urban
underemployed and unemployed, physically removing wahuni and wavivu to
the rural areas – the proper location for their participation in the develop-
mental project. ‘Every person has to work hard and share’, observed one
editorial, ‘ these are the politics which are used by our republic to build the
nation. Unyonyaji in Tanzania is forbidden’.47 Much oﬃcial rhetoric and
policy over the 1960s and 1970s was directed towards removing the exploi-
tation of shiftless Africans. Another shairi poet oﬀered the following verse in
regard to the country’s idlers:
The lazy are a hindrance, to our development
They don’t like work, they don’t grin when they work
To deceive is their work, our home is a broken heart
The lazy are the enemy, we must keep our eye on them48
There was a popular aspect to demonizing wahuni insofar as some Africans
welcomed ﬁerce vigilance against thieves – one Buguruni resident asked
government to bring a revolution to the neighbourhood to remove magai (i.e.
wahuni) who hid their stolen wealth there.49 The grim colonial practice of
repatriating underemployed and unemployed wahuni was pursued with
greater zeal during the postcolonial years, and continued to be based on the
same colonial calculus of unrealized labour productivity until demographic
45 Daily News, 23 Feb. 1976; Uhuru, 6 Mar. 1976; Rosaleen Smyth, ‘The feature ﬁlm
in Tanzania’, African Aﬀairs, 88 (1989), 389–96. Original reads: ﬁmbo ya mnyonge ni
kuishi pamoja, ujamaa ni kuishi pamoja. ‘Fimbo ya Mnyonge’ had been an ujamaa village
propaganda programme on Radio Tanzania since the mid-1960s. ‘Taarifa ya Mwalimu
wa Radio Kipindi cha ‘‘Fimbo ya Mnyonge’’ ’, Ujamaa, 14 (1968), 4–10. For an analysis
of the context of nation-building cinema and ﬁlm-going, see James R. Brennan,
‘Democratizing cinema and censorship in Tanzania, 1920–1980’, International Journal of
African Historical Studies, 38 (2005), 481–511.
46 Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 165. Nyerere’s viliﬁcation of the urban ‘lazy’ had only
increased by the 1970s. In his article ‘Wafanyakazi wavivu, wazembe na wategaji ni wa-
nyonyaji ’, Ujamaa, 35 (1974), 5–18, Julius Nyerere argued that urban workers had more
responsibility to work hard than did farmers, because their laziness was not automatically
punished, while farmers’ laziness was automatically punished by decreased crop
production. 47 Uhuru, 21 Jan. 1965.
48 ‘Wavivu niMaadui’ by E.Mizambwa, in F. E.Mlingwa (ed.),Diwani Yetu (Arusha,
1970), 6–7. Original reads: Wavivu ni wazuizi, wa yetu maendeleo/Wao hawapendi kazi,
hawacheka wafanyao/Kutega ni yao kazi, kwetu ni vunjo la moyo/Wavivu ni maadui, lazima
tuwatazame.
49 Letter of ‘Mkazi mwingine wa Buguruni ’, Uhuru, 7 Dec. 1967.
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realities ﬁnally overwhelmed the zeal and resources of the ujamaa state by the
1980s.
The urban public sphere, much like urban public space, remained
aggressively male under ujamaa. Nationalist paeans to Tanzanian women
invariably depicted them as rural and in the plural. African male nationalists,
particularly members of the TANU Youth League, identiﬁed single urban
women as a virulent group of bloodsuckers (wanyonyaji).50 Single women in
towns were suspected of being prostitutes, around which practice a rich
language developed – guberi, a term for colonialist or imperialist, also meant
‘prostitute’. Men came to use the graphic term kupe (tick) to describe
women, because of their alleged reliance on male providers.51 In his travels
around Dar es Salaam, the cartoon character ‘Bwanyenye’ meets two types
of women – those traditionally dressed in kangas who usually exhort him to
act in accordance with ujamaa and get work, and those in decidedly modern
dress who insult him for his rural appearance. Bwanyenye treats the former
with respect, but harangues ‘modern’ women for destroying the nation’s
reputation by dressing irresponsibly (kuvaa kihuni) or like an animal (ya
kinyama), pointing out that even his waist cloth at least covered his private
parts.52 Young unmarried women living in towns – alongside their male
counterparts – formed major focal points of postcolonial nationalist anxiety.
OTE DUGU MOJA : THE SOUTH ASIAN CARICATURE IN UJAMAA
NATIONALIST RHETORIC
South Asians had long served as unpopular ﬁgures in the imagination of
many Tanzanian Africans. Before and during the anti-colonial nationalist
movement, Indians were frequently targeted as primary obstacles to devel-
opment and African self-improvement. By the time TANU had become an
important force demanding independence, Indians had – at least in Africans’
popular perception – responded by ridiculing Africans’ competence to rule
themselves. Ramadhan Machado Plantan, editor of the independent news-
paper Zuhra, warned Asians that their days of calling on African prostitutes,
insulting Africans with the widely understood Gujarati epithet golo (slave),
and dismissing nationalist ambitions with the question ‘where will he get
the ability/competence to rule?’ (ataweza wapi kuupata utawala?, often
‘Indianized’ as weja wapi?), were ﬁnally coming to an end.53 The name Patel
had become common slang to refer to all Indians, while the term mwananchi,
meaning citizen with strong connotations of patriotism (literally, ‘child of
the land’) was exclusively used to describe Africans –Mwananchi and Patel
became self-evidently antonymic terms in popular discourse.54
50 For treatments of this see Gary Burgess, ‘Cinema, bell bottoms, and miniskirts :
struggles over youth and citizenship in revolutionary Zanzibar’, International Journal of
African Historical Studies, 35 (2002), 287–313; and Andrew Ivaska, ‘Negotiating ‘‘cul-
ture’’ in a cosmopolitan capital : urban style and the Tanzanian state in colonial and
postcolonial Dar es Salaam’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 2003).
51 Ostrovsky and Tejani, ‘Second tentative word list ’ ; letter of Joel A. Kitubika,
Ngurumo, 28 Sept. 1967.
52 Ngurumo, 15 July 1967, 19 Aug. 1967 and 18 July 1970.
53 Zuhra, 22 Nov. 1957. 54 Scotton, ‘Political words’, 532–3.
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After independence, bitter sarcasm directed at the disparity between
the postcolonial ideal of equality and persisting reality of racial inequality –
encapsulated in the phrase ote dugu moja, a reference to the distinctly Indian
pronunciation of the nationalist mantra sisi sote undugu mmoja or ‘we are all
one family’ – became a deﬁning element of Tanzanian nationalist rhetoric.55
Typical in its vocabulary and tone, one African writer evaluated racial
inequalities persisting within the ‘family’ of postcolonial Tanzania:
One day at a Sundowner, Patel was there with his tea, Smith with his glass of beer,
everyone saying we are one family (sisi wote dugu moja) in front of manaizesheni
(successful Africans), tomorrow (Patel) will see his servant and disregard this
Mwananchi, in fact he lords it over him and bullies him and continues to suck his
blood. For the same work Kabwela receives 150/- and Patel receives 300/-; Juma
carries a heavy load, and Patel carries a light load. Oh friend what kind of family is
this? (Oh jamma undugu huu ni wa namna gani?)56
Indians’ failure to integrate into the ujamaa family was underscored by their
lack of participation in ‘nation-building’ activities, despite government’s
regular exhortations. One writer suggested that government arrest dugu moja
if they were caught staring from windows instead of actively joining in such
activities as political marches or the reception of foreign dignitaries.57 The
rural bias of ujamaa and absence of any corresponding urban policy enabled
the proliferation of popular interpretations of urban ujamaa that frequently
turned on removing South Asian privilege and isolation. The continuation of
racial segregation in Dar es Salaam bitterly frustrated African nationalists.
For them, urban ujamaa should, above all, result in the eradication of this
iniquity. The politics of ujamaa, one observer wrote, was ‘to live as a family
without regard to race, wealth, tribe, status, etc. ’. He was disheartened,
however, to see uzunguni or the European neighbourhood continue to exist,
populated by ‘Indians, Hindus, Khojas, Europeans’, but not one African. He
called on government to take up Zanzibar’s urban policies, where Africans
now lived side by side with ‘whites’ (watu weupe or ‘non-Africans’), in order
to help mainlanders identify ‘our enemies’.58
Tanzania’s popular press was particularly anxious to demonstrate how
Indians repeatedly transgressed the spirit and norms of ujamaa. Beginning in
the late 1960s, the party dailyUhuru began a sort of ‘everyman’ column, the
self-entitled Miye (Kaka Miye in Sunday’s Mzalendo paper), in which a
recurring set of characters were engaged in ﬁctional dialogues about issues of
the day.Miye’s attempts at political humour regularly came at the expense of
South Asians, while Arabs and Europeans were less frequently lampooned.
In his representation of ﬁctional Indian characters,Miye employedKiswahili
55 Even before independence, African writers complained that Indians used this phrase
only when they needed to get something from Africans. ‘Huu ni ‘‘Udugu’’ wa Kabila
Gani?’ by ‘Msema Kweli’, Mwafrika, 6 Aug. 1960.
56 Letter from Justin D. Mungia, Uhuru, 30 Jan. 1965.
57 Letter of Iddi R. Selemani, Uhuru, 23 Dec. 1965. See also Standard, 30 June 1964;
Nationalist, 17 Nov. 1964; letter of D. J. K. Mwakipesile, T, 4 Jan. 1965; Standard, 2
Mar. 1965; Uhuru, 21 July 1966.
58 Letter of J. Kimilu, Ngurumo, 12 Sept. 1969. Several prominent African politicians
in fact had begun moving into uzunguni or the ‘European area’ shortly before indepen-
dence, but the neighbourhood did remain exclusive in a class sense.
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cha Kihindi, or the distinctive pidgin Swahili dialect spoken by many South
Asians. Characterized by its lack of aﬃxes, excessive use of pronouns and
substitution of ‘ j ’ for ‘z’, Kiswahili cha Kihindi reﬂects its origins as a
commercial bridge between Indians and Africans, and symbolized the failure
of the former fully to master the language’s complexities.59 A key literary
tool of Miye was to contrast his own correct Kiswahili with the tortuous,
caricatured Swahili of his Indian characters, in particular a recurrent Indian
shopkeeper named Mamujee.60
The purpose ofMiye was to reveal, again and again, just how out of touch
Indians were with ujamaa and the basic tenets of Tanzanian nationalism. In
one typical column,Miye demonstrates that Indians continue to hold ﬁrmly
colonial attitudes about ‘multi-racial ’ society rather than heeding calls to
‘build the nation’. This ﬁctional conversation followed a real speech by
India’s President Varahagiri Venkata Giri, who had just exhorted Indians in
Dar es Salaam to respect ujamaa and help to build the nation by taking up
farmwork:
Miye: And you, Bwana Mamujee, when a guest of the nation arrives, quit
that game of peeping through the window. You have to line up on the streets
with other Tanzanians to receive him.
Mamujee: Yes friend, big man already say, All Indians agree, Hindus,
Arabs, Swahili all one family (ote dugu moja). Giri already say.
Miye: And in the work of building the nation, don’t stay behind.
Mamujee: Friend, if all Indians build nation, who sell curry powder?
Mama Mamujee: If all Indians close shop, where get bread?
Miye: The honorable Giri, has already said, you now have to wind up your
shops and begin the work of building the nation.
Mama Mamujee: If all Indian go build nation, where Swahili get rice?
Miye: At the cooperative shops.
Mamujee: If all Indian close shop, where Swahili get …
Miye: Get lost !
Mamujee: Friend, you smoke goro? Say what now? God divide people
three parts: White rule, Indian build shop, Swahili dance. Don’t you know?
After this conversation, Miye bitterly ruminates on how the Indian
President’s call was being (mis)received by hawa ndugu zetu, or ‘our family
members’.61 In a visit to the city of Mwanza, Mamujee complains to Miye
that everyone now uses the word taiﬁsha (nationalize), when the only word
he could ﬁnd in his dictionary was taifa (nation).62 Miye later addresses two
59 A. M. Khamis, ‘Swahili as a national language’, in Gabriel Ruhumbika (ed.),
Towards Ujamaa: Twenty Years of TANU Leadership (Dar es Salaam, 1974), 291. In
addition, Khamis mentions the existence of Kiswahili cha Kimanga or Arab Swahili,
which also appears in the columns of Miye and other Kiswahili media, though with less
frequency.
60 The comic and social eﬀects of this caricature are diﬃcult to communicate in trans-
lation. The pivotal role of Swahili language in Tanzania’s nation-building project has
been long recognized by scholars. See, inter alia, WilfredWhiteley, Swahili: The Rise of a
National Language (London, 1975); and more recently, Ali Mazrui and Alamin Mazrui,
Swahili State and Society: The Political Economy of an African Language (Nairobi, 1995).
61 ‘Mwito wa Rais Giri kwa Wahindi waliopo Tanzania unazingatiwa?’ by ‘Miye’,
Uhuru, 11 Oct. 1972. 62 Uhuru, 25 July 1973.
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Indians distraught about the recent building nationalization by greeting
them with hamjambo wananchi. The address is meant to convey bittersweet
irony, for wananchi or ‘patriot citizen’ sharply contrasts with what for Miye
are plainly ‘unpatriotic’ and non-citizen Indians. One replies, ‘we are not
citizens. Will TANU card do instead?’63
Racial debate also focused on the purpose of the media itself. One Dar es
Salaam resident complained that Indian, Arab and Somali shopowners
played Radio Tanganyika only to attract business, without any interest in the
political education programming or even understanding of Swahili broad-
casts.64 In response to a South Asian’s complaint regarding the termination
of Hindi-language programming on Radio Tanzania – particularly unjust, he
griped, given the large radio fee contributions made by Indians – TANU’s
English-language daily Nationalist produced an instructive rant encapsulat-
ing the spectrum of African resentment towards Indians:
Let it be said frankly that Wananchi have tolerated enough of the abuses of these
people [Indians]. Indeed, these are the same people who during our struggle for
Uhuru used to tell us ‘weja wapi’. These are the people who have refused to learn
our national language, Kiswahili. These are the same people who, when there is a
national function or meeting go to the beaches instead of attending. These are the
people who have failed to oﬀer any substantial Africanisation in their businesses.
These are the people who have refused to take part physically in nation building
work. These are the people who hoard foodstuﬀs. These are the people who in-
crease prices unilaterally whenever there is a call for national sacriﬁce! ! These are
the people who threaten us with imaginary inﬂations and all sorts of dangers in
order to hold back our nation building spirit ! These are the same people who are
prepared to exploit Wananchi remorselessly under the guise of ‘dugu moja’. These
are the people who are prepared to call themselves Tanzanians only as long as they
remain a privileged group! It is imperative this claim for special privilege should
stop. It is incompatible with our attitude to citizenship and nation-building and
cannot be tolerated.65
Popular and oﬃcial attitudes towards Indians seem to have coincided, and
it is diﬃcult to determine who was inﬂuenced by whom. Despite Nyerere’s
own philosophical opposition and personal dislike of racial polemics, many
prominent members of the mainland and especially Zanzibari government
actively inﬂamed anti-Asian sentiment. Asian dominance of retail and
wholesale commerce became a regular focal point of nationalist attacks
against exploitation. Calls by black Tanzanian parliamentarians to expel
Asians were regular; some proposed expulsion even if they had assumed
citizenship.66 Zanzibar President Abeid Karume, Tanzania’s second-highest
63 ‘Jamaa wanalalamika ‘Siasa Jamaa ﬁkiri chejo?’ ’, by ‘Miye’, Uhuru, 8 May 1971.
Original reads: Sisi hapana wananchi. Kadi TANU weja?
64 Letter of M. J. D. Kwanoga, Ngurumo, 2 Oct. 1964.
65 Nationalist, 26 Nov. 1966.
66 Dar es Salaam’s member of parliament, Kitwana S. Kondo, argued in parliament
that many Asians were opportunists in that they have naturalized for economic motives.
He stated that ‘The Asians make known their citizenship only in times of hardship or
when they want to obtain something’. Amid cheers and applause from the House, Mr.
Kondo said: ‘Asians are forming a community of their own. They show no willingness to
co-operate and integrate with other people’. Mr. Kondo stated further that some Asians
hated not only Africans, but they also hated and suspected fellow Asians who joined
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oﬃcial and nationalist id to Nyerere’s superego, gave oﬃcial notice in 1970
and 1971 to all non-citizen Indians in Tanzania to quit the country within a
year.67 Asian expulsions from Tanzania, usually on grounds of either bribery
or failure to observe immigration laws, were touted in the press and
celebrated in its editorials.68 Meanwhile, African nationalists sought to
invert colonial norms by demanding that Indians integrate with Africans by
working on farms. Nyerere himself exhorted Asians and Arabs to give up
urban life, grab a hoe and farm.69
The cost and availability of housing became perhaps the most pressing
issue among Dar es Salaam’s residents. Continued segregated housing
patterns and striking disparities in wealth between Indians and Africans
made the former an easy target. An inordinate percentage of the large, multi-
storeyed residential buildings constructed in the 1960s were built by and for
Indians, and having access to their communal and ﬁnancial resources was
deemed necessary to get good housing. One African observed in reference to
Dar es Salaam’s perpetual housing crisis, kama wewe si Patel hupati chumba,
‘ if you are not Indian, you won’t get a room’.70 In April 1971, in response to
popular pressure for more housing and government’s plain inability to
provide it, the state nationalized all buildings worth over 100,000 shillings
and not entirely occupied by the owner. This move alienated a large number
of Indians who had invested their life savings in housing, in part to demon-
strate their commitment to living in the new nation. The subsequent exodus
of Tanzania’s Asians was exacerbated by Idi Amin’s expulsion of all Indians
from Uganda in August 1972. Such was the unpopularity of South Asians in
Tanzania that Nyerere’s government refused to accept any refugees, turning
away 83 Indians stranded at sea without a country. The wave of housing and
business nationalizations between 1967 and 1976 eﬀectively drove out over
half of Tanzania’s Indian population.71
KABWELA AND NAIZESHENI : URBAN CITIZENSHIP AND CLASS IN
UJAMAA SOCIALISM
In his 1962 pamphlet Ujamaa – The Basis of African Socialism, Julius
Nyerere argued that ujamaa did not start from the existence of conﬂicting
classes in society, and even doubts that a word for class exists in any
TANU and co-operated with ‘the indigenous people of this country’. He appealed to the
Immigration Department to be ‘very cautious when granting citizenship to such people’.
‘Asians exploit under political patronage’, Nationalist, 17 July 1968.
67 Nationalist, 30 Oct. 1970, 17 Mar. 1971.
68 Standard, 25 Jan. 1967; Nationalist, 13 Aug. 1969; Editorial, Uhuru, 13 Aug. 1969;
Nationalist, 22 Apr. 1970. 69 Ngurumo, 21 Jan. 1967.
70 Letter of Peter Shizya, Ngurumo, 22 Feb. 1964.
71 Nationalist, 24 Apr. 1971; Daily News, 18 Aug. 1972. See also Ronald Aminzade,
‘The politics of race and nation: citizenship and Africanization in Tanganyika’, Political
Power and Social Theory, 14 (2000), 53–90; and Richa Nagar, ‘The South Asian diaspora
in Tanzania: a history retold’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East, 16 (1996), 62–80. Those Indian traders who remained, however, proﬁted from nu-
merous grey- or black-market opportunities, and were ideally placed to take advantage of
the liberalization policies begun in the late 1980s. Ibid. For background on South Asians’
expulsions in postcolonial East Africa, see Michael Twaddle (ed.), Expulsion of a
Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians (London, 1975).
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indigenous African language.72 The passage is famous for its idealization of
Africa’s past; it also demonstrates the chasm between Nyerere’s idealization
of Africa’s present and the reality of a robust language of class emerging on
the streets of Dar es Salaam. While class conﬂict under ujamaa socialism
has not passed unnoticed by researchers,73 the popular language of class
that comprised a central element of postcolonial urban life largely has.
Unavoidably, this language developed within the values and constraints of
ujamaa ideology. The postcolonial Tanzanian nationalism of ujamaa rested
on loyal citizenry willing to partake in nation-building exercises and not only
refrain from exploitation of fellow citizens but to ﬁght it. To the extent that
there were classes within this national conception of citizenship, there were
two – the peasant (mkulima), who was the ideal citizen and lived and farmed
in the rural areas; and the worker (mfanyakazi), the urban citizen necessary
for some aspects of national development but whose activities and growth
were more closely scrutinized by the state. These nationalist categories of
citizenship were understood in opposition to urban-based wanyonyaji such as
wahuni, ‘ immodest’ women, and Indians.
Anti-urban in its bias, oﬃcial ujamaa rhetoric never clearly deﬁned in
positive terms the ideal African urban citizen. He (the basic categories were
male) was instead known by the exploitation he suﬀered as a result of the
costs and dangers of city living. African residents of Dar es Salaam, however,
articulated a more positive terminology for the ordinary townsman: kabwela.
This term had similar connotations to the contemporary meaning of
mswahili – a person who was simultaneously crafty and potentially deceitful,
yet also poor and generally exploited.Kabwelawas the common denominator
of urban nationalist frustrations; a Tanzanian Everyman or John Bull (like
John Bull, the rhetorical personage of kabwela was also male).74 Other
popular terms for the urban poor carried disagreeable connotations – mhuni
was plainly pejorative and oﬃcially condemned; mmatumbi, another popular
72 Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 169. Such logic was hardly unique to Tanzania –
M. Crawford Young writes that ‘ in its generalized African form, nationalism denied the
existence of class’. Young, ‘Nationalism’, 441.
73 The best starting point for this is the work of Issa Shivji : The Silent Class Struggle
(Dar es Salaam, 1973) and Class Struggles in Tanzania (London, 1976).
74 The origins of the term are obscure. Kabwela appears to have originated from a
popular song and slogan hailing Nyerere’s return from the United Nations in 1957, but by
the early 1960s it had become the ubiquitous term for the deserving urban citizen who
needed the TANU government’s assistance. During the 1960s, the origins of the word
kabwela became a topic of debate in the press. To the extent that there was any consensus,
the original term appears to have been ‘Tata Kabwela’, which, far from meaning a poor
person seeking protection and help from the government (its common employment in
discourse), was originally a term written on a jerry can (debe) by a Zaramo mganda mu-
sician on a Saturday in 1957 when Nyerere returned triumphant from his third trip to the
United Nations – the mganda wrote a song entitled ‘Tata Kabwela UNO’, meaning
simply that Nyerere (baba) has returned from UNO for the third time – kabwela the
Zaramo word for someone who has returned (perhaps from the root kabla, meaning
‘before’ or ‘previous’). Letter of R. A. Chambuso,Ngurumo, 3 July 1965; letter of S. Sh.
Mbonde,Ngurumo, 26 May 1967; letter of Mahamad Jume,Uhuru, 2 Dec. 1967; letter of
Nyanza Omari, Ngurumo, 8 Aug. 1968. Another argued that it was a Zaramo joking
(kuitana) word for a child who knows nothing. Letter from N. A. Mkopire, Ngurumo, 19
July 1965. Temu, ‘Political vocabulary’, claims that kabwela is a Nyamwezi word.
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term for ‘everyman’, was too ethnically speciﬁc.75 Its imprecise origins and
usage enabled kabwela to become the ubiquitous term used in public dis-
course to make sense of the plight of town-dwellers, especially among the
residents of Dar es Salaam where the term originated. Despite working hard
and (somewhat) honestly, kabwela found himself exploited by rack-renting
landlords, cheating shopkeepers and abusive employers. The rhetorical
personage of kabwela enabled TANU and its undesired but intractable urban
population to negotiate with each other.
The popular discursive antonym to kabwela was naizesheni, or naizi for
short. Naizesheni referred to those urban Africans who with relatively little
eﬀort came to enjoy the lion’s share of the fruits of independence by in-
heriting the privileges of departing colonialists. The term clearly derives
from ‘nationalization’ and less directly from ‘Africanization’, both processes
in the public eye during the early years of independence. Alongside naizi
emerged a related vocabulary that laid moral judgments against the easy
success that some Africans enjoyed.Nyeupe, literally meaning ‘white’, was a
slang adverb for ‘easy to get’ ; in this vein, the term mweusi mzungu or ‘black
European’ refers in part to the easy life that some Africans enjoyed after
independence. The popular antonym to nyeupe or white was not black
(nyeusi) but kienyeji, meaning ‘local ’ or ‘native’ ; to travel as a stowaway on a
train was chukua safari kienyeji or ‘take a trip local-style’, in contrast to those
who could aﬀord tickets for a seat. The word jengesha, perhaps derived from
those who organized the building of the nation, meant ‘to grow fat’, a bodily
metaphor ubiquitous in sub-Saharan African political discourse linked to
easy success and inattention to others’ welfare.76
Kabwela and naizi were popular class terms that enabled urban residents
to speak about the social realities of economic diﬀerentiation beyond the
Manichean categories of wananchi and wanyonyaji prescribed in oﬃcial dis-
course. The terms were sociologically imprecise – a kabwela could be a
recently arrived water carrier or an old dockworker who had lived his whole
life in Dar es Salaam; a naizi could be a landlord, a civil servant or a suc-
cessful trader – because their dual purpose was to make sense of rapid social
changes and to pronounce moral judgments on them. It was typical for
kabwela to bemoan naizi’s easy life, which was believed to have come at his
expense. The terms also served to express anxiety over how and where
kabwela ﬁt in postcolonial urban society. A disgruntled tenant pondered
where kabwela would live if tin-roofed houses were to arrive in the peri-
urban residential area of Manzese, as he had earlier been chased out of
Magomeni by the same naizi gentrifying forces of African landlords and
their aﬄuent African tenants.77 Anger arising from economic diﬀerentiation
between kabwela and naizi often punctured the spirit of humour in which the
terms were cast. The anonymous author of Ngurumo’s serial ‘Ala! Kumbe’
75 Mmatumbi is simply the name of an ethnic group, who live mostly in Tanzania’s
Ruﬁji region.Wamatumbi immigrants to Dar es Salaam were associated with poverty and
lack of education.
76 The ruling party’s popular campaign song and slogan was TANU yajenga nchi. See
contemporary word lists cited in footnote above. On bodily metaphors in African political
discourse, see Mbembe, On the Postcolony ; and Jean-Franc¸ois Bayart, The State in
Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London, 1993).
77 Letter of G. B. Kaputula, Ngurumo, 23 July 1964; Uhuru, 12 May 1966.
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narrated the story of a man named Mzegamzega, who took violent oﬀence to
being called kabwela by his neighbours. A friend ﬁnally calmedMzegamzega
down by explaining to him that he should not be oﬀended by kabwela
because the term merely signiﬁed the endless gradations of material
inequality in Tanzania:
If it’s like this, then even those who own cars are kabwelas. Because the Volkswagen
owner is the kabwela of the Peugot owner, and the Peugot owner is kabwela of the
Benz owner, and the Benz owner is the kabwela of the lorry, and the lorry owner is
the kabwela of the bus owner.78
Class consciousness in this popular sense appears to have been particularly
sharp among naizi. Middle-to-upper level African civil servants, the most
easily identiﬁable of the naizi, demonstrated their identiﬁcation with the term
when The Civil Service Magazine published a shairi poem criticizing naizi
for their selﬁshness and irresponsibility. Several civil servants responded
with their own shairi that either defended naizi behaviour or called on naizi
to heed this reproach and behave better.79
The growth of this unoﬃcial vocabulary received a mixed reception
from government oﬃcials. By their very nature, terms such as kabwela
and naizesheni carried humorous, sometimes self-deprecating, overtones
far removed from the sombre pronouncements of oﬃcial propaganda.
The rhetorical excesses of ujamaa were often mocked. Before the Arusha
Declaration, people might involve the ironic query, ‘where are you going,
citizen’ (unakwenda wapi, mwananchi), to which the reply was, ‘I’m going to
build the nation’ (nakwenda kujenga taifa).80 Shortly after government
pronounced the ‘straws of exploitation’ cut, people on the streets of Dar es
Salaam would jokingly tell someone drinking a Fanta soda to stop, because
‘the straws have been cut’ (mirija imekatwa). Mpinduzi wa serikali or
government revolutionary became a slang term for an adulterer.81 Thaabit
Kombo, a Zanzibari member of parliament, demanded in 1965 that the
federal government outlaw the usage of kabwela on the same grounds that the
Islands’ government had earlier banned public usage of mhuni – because
under ujamaa all people should be equal, and both words made light of
irresponsible youth.82 Most government oﬃcials, who by deﬁnition were
78 Ngurumo, 17 Apr. 1969. In his 1977 novel, Zika Mwenyewe, Alex Banzi portrays a
young oﬃcial in Dar es Salaam who falls out with his lower-class, Zaramo neighbours.
During a heated argument, the protagonist disparages his poorer neighbors by calling
them makabwela, and they respond angrily by calling him naizi and harangue him with
militant ujamaa slogans – wazalendo oyeee, vibaraka zii!, or ‘patriots hurrah, down with
the puppet-lackeys! ’. Alex Banzi, Zika Mwenyewe (Dar es Salaam, 1977), quoted in
Rajmund Ohly, The Zanzibarian Challenge: Swahili Prose in the Years 1975–1981
(Windhoek, 1990), 90–2. For a superlative survey of Swahili literature and drama, see
Elena Zubkova Bertoncini, Outline of Swahili Literature (Leiden, 1989).
79 ‘Naize na Visa Vyao’ by S. S. Nyanzugu, The Civil Service Magazine, Nov./Dec.
1965; various shairi in ibid., Jan./Feb. 1966. The rhetorical personages of kabwela and
naizi had a moiety-like eﬀect over Dar es Salaam’s public discourse – a combined football
team of players from popular local teams formed to call itself ‘Tata-Kabwera’ in its match
against commercial workers calling themselves ‘Africanaizesheni ’. Mwafrika, 15 July
1963. 80 Scotton, ‘Political words’, 532.
81 Letter of Abdulla Salum, Ngurumo, 22 Feb. 1967; Ostrovsky and Tejani, ‘Second
tentative word list ’. 82 Ngurumo, 19 June 1965.
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naizi, ultimately if rather grudgingly accepted these terms, even brieﬂy
lending their imprimatur by giving them oﬃcial deﬁnitions in an ujamaa
primer.83 Government eventually engaged with this popular discourse by
representing itself as the benefactor of kabwela, and used this personage as a
convenient foil to wahuni or the unwanted urban hooligans.84 Although the
TANU state exercised censorship in a heavy-handed way – in 1970 it banned
Playboy, Drum and Flamingo magazines, and nationalized the Lonrho-
owned, English-language daily newspaper the Standard – it generally tol-
erated more subtle criticisms embodied in popular press humour.85
It would be mistaken to draw too ﬁrm a distinction between oﬃcial and
popular nationalist vocabularies of postcolonial Tanzania. The state’s purge
categories still set limits on what could be argued in the popular press. To be
mhuni (hooligan) remained anathema. Urban males who identiﬁed with
kabwela asserted that mhuni was not a natural state, but an unfortunate
condition that they struggled to overcome. Many traced the condition to the
dilemma of being single and without good housing – landlords often would
not rent to single men, and women would not agree to marry men without a
home or room.86 Urban residents in Tanzania utilized the nationalist
vocabulary of oﬃcial terms like unyonyaji and unoﬃcial ones like naizi and
kabwela to address the same set of concerns that Africans in the city had faced
since the Second World War – making moral claims to obtain impossibly
expensive urban necessities that were promised but not quite delivered by
government, and instead mediated through inequitable economic structures.
Most Africans came to Dar es Salaam to ﬁnd work, but urban residency and
citizenship were ultimately predicated on each person’s success in securing
the mundane needs of food, clothing and housing. Africans in Dar es Salaam
used the term unyonyaji and its English equivalent ‘exploitation’ in popular
discourse to debate the morality of impossibly high prices of food, clothing
and rents.87 The rhetorical personage of naizi served as a moral surveillance
on wealthy urban Africans to constantly remind them of their responsibilities
to the new nation. The rhetorical personage of kabwela enabled poor urban
Africans to claim an urban existence otherwise ignored or forbidden by
ujamaa policy, and eventually to demand that government take up its
83 TANU, Mafunzo ya Azimio la Arusha na Siasa, 36–7. This Arusha Declaration
primer deﬁnes kabwela as mtu wa hali ya chini (person of low standing), and naizi as mtu
wa hali ya juu au mtu mwenye cheo fulani (person of high standing or person of a certain
rank). 84 Ngurumo, 30 Dec. 1967.
85 Uhuru and Nationalist were TANU papers until government also took them over in
1970. There is no adequate study of press censorship in postcolonial Tanzania; for
background see Stephen Arnold, ‘‘Popular literature in Tanzania: its background and
relation to ‘‘East African’’ literature’,Kiswahili, 51 (1984), 60–86; Hadji S. Konde, Press
Freedom in Tanzania (Arusha, 1984); and Martin Sturmer, Sprachpolitik und
Pressegeschichte in Tanzania (Wien, 1995), 91–143 (also translated as The Media History
of Tanzania [Ndanda, 1999]).
86 Letters of Peter Shizya and E. P. Isakwisa, Ngurumo, 22 Feb. 1964, 11 Feb. 1966.
One person caught in this dilemma asked to be called kabwela instead of mhuni, because
the latter describes an irresponsible person. Letter of Mohamed Mziwanda,Ngurumo, 18
Feb. 1966.
87 This debate covers nearly the entire period under examination. For pre-Arusha
Declaration correspondence, see letters of Rapt K. Mbeyu, R. S. Mayao, B. P. Maro and
P. Mkwama, Ngurumo, 23 Nov. 1960, 10 Feb. 1961, 10 July 1964, 16 Mar. 1965.
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responsibility to remove conditions of uhuni (hooliganism) endured un-
willingly by kabwela.
CONCLUSION
The success of Tanzanian nationalist political thought depended on poli-
ticians’ abilities to wed local discourses of extraction and eradication with
global ideas of anti-colonialism and socialism. By claiming to be the nation’s
diviner and eradicator of unyonyaji, the TANU government expressed in
rich language the revolutionary basis of its sovereignty and legitimacy.
However, it found itself confronted with many of the same problems that had
faced its colonial predecessor. In urban areas like Dar es Salaam, the post-
colonial state chose to continue colonial urban policies, relying on price
regulations and movement restrictions rather than committing the necessary
investments to manage urban growth. Nationalist politicians also shared the
assumption of British colonial oﬃcials that Africans (excepting themselves)
could best serve the country by engaging in rural production, and adopted
the colonial purge category of mhuni as their own. Drawing on a politics of
enmity, TANU leaders introduced a host of purge categories that served to
explain present diﬃculties and justify aggressive government programmes.
At the level of ujamaa ideology, urban problems were basically ones involv-
ing wanyonyaji, and government’s solutions were accordingly predicated on
the removal of these enemies.
As Nyerere’s vision was essentially agrarian, the term ‘urban ujamaa ’ is
something of an oxymoron. Yet despite government’s overwhelming rural
bias and its heavy-handed repatriation operations, urban growth continued
unabated after independence. African migrants to Tanzanian cities were
generally unwelcome; at best they were left alone to navigate an urban terrain
dominated by ‘bloodsuckers’ of all sorts. With humour and savvy, urban
Africans made sense out of fast-moving changes, seemingly beyond govern-
ment’s discursive and coercive controls, by crafting their own urban
vocabulary. Urban class diﬀerentiation was understood not through
government’s purge categories but through rhetorical personages created by
town-dwellers themselves. Kabwela and naizi opened discursive space that
enabled poor Africans to live legitimate lives in cities, and called into
question the morality of wealthier Africans who enjoyed the lion’s share
of uhuru’s fruits. This popular vocabulary revealed African aspirations to
urban citizenship, but its deployment also expressed deep enmity towards
‘non-citizens’. In particular, attitudes towards Indians shared by both
urban Africans and the state remained quite unambiguous during this
period – Indians represented the urban wanyonyaji par excellence who
remained socially aloof despite ubiquitous rhetorical admonishments to join
the nation in its work.
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